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This study aims to analyze the effect of corporate governance on transparency as 
measured by stock return synchronicity. The variables used are board size 
(commissioner), big4 audit, institutional ownership, market to book, the volatility of 
firm fundamentals, leverage, and firm size. This study uses a quantitative approach 
with multiple linear analysis models. This study uses a sample of non-financial 
business entities listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI). The number of 
samples used in this study was 198 observations. The results showed that the variable 
board size (commissioner), institutional ownership, and leverage had a positive effect 
on transparency, and the implied volatility of the firm hurt transparency. Other 
variables such as big4 audit, market to book ratio, and firm size do not affect 
transparency. 
Keywords: transparency, corporate governance, stock return synchronicity 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance plays an essential role in the company and will impact the 
company's finances. Corporate governance can be used as a strength within the 
company to compete in the current situation. Companies that have good governance 
will be more transparent compared to companies that do not have proper 
management. 
In this study, the transparency of the company will be measure using stock 
return synchronicity. Morck et al. (2000) state that the stock return will move along 
with market returns. Khandaker (2011) explains that Stock return synchronicity 
shows the stock market's tendency to move in the same direction for some time to 
come. The market will be synchronized if, in general, individual share prices move 
together. Sometimes, the concepts of beta and synchronicity become difficult to 
separate. This concept is because both ideas show the same relationship between a 
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company's asset return and market return. However, there are fundamental 
differences between these two concepts. Synchronicity explained how the market 
return explains the performance of a company's assets, while beta reflects the 
systematic risk of a company's assets, which is usually measured by the contribution 
of the risk of an asset to the portfolio (Farooq & El Bannan, 2019). In plain language, 
beta is the contribution of an asset to the market, whereas synchronicity contributes 
the market to an asset. Jin and Myers (2006) argue that stock return synchronicity can 
be interpreted as a measure of corporate transparency because it shows how much the 
market index reflects the return of a company's stock. Khandaker and Heaney (2008) 
stated that countries with high inflation, corruption, and bad corporate governance 
have higher stock market synchronicity in developing countries. 
According to Morck et al. (2000), there are two models for looking at stock 
return synchronicity. The first model includes the market-wide movement in the price 
of shares of individual companies for a certain period, known as the Classical 
Synchronicity measure. Furthermore, the second model is the market model using R 
Square measurement, which includes specific stock price movements reflected in 
overall stock price movements. Market-wide synchronicity described where shares in 
the stock market move together at a time. While firm-level synchronicity is defined, 
the price of a stock moves along with the market return at a time. This research 
focuses on firm-level synchronicity, where trading shares based on the amount of 
company-specific information will make stock prices contain company-specific 
information and reduce synchronization of stock prices (Durnev et al., 2003, Tee, 
2017). The stock return synchronicity concept assumes that stock prices and stock 
returns explain two information; first, the company information and market 
information. When the stock returns can be defined more by the market information, 
the stock returns have high synchronicity. According to Gul et al. (2010), when 
synchronicity is high, the company information obtained from the company's stock 
returns is low, so that the company's transparency is low. Second, company 
information can explain stock returns, and the shares will show idiosyncratic 
dependencies. Idiosyncratic is a risk that reflects specific information about the 
company, and the risk will change according to changes in company-related 
information. Also, the company's stock price would be reflected in the company's 
stock price that can be used to measure the level of transparency of the company. 
Gyamfi et al. (2015) measure corporate governance towards transparency. The 
Ghana study found that board size, market to book ratio, implied volatility of firm, 
and audit quality positively affected synchronicity, while CEO duality harmed 
synchronicity. Tas and Tan's research (2016) found that board size and CEO duality 
hurt the synchronicity and volatility of firm fundamentals, and the market to book 
ratio had a positive effect on synchronicity. While other research by An and Zhang 
(2013) provides the results of institutional ownership, size, and volatility of firm 
fundamentals positively affect synchronicity, While the leverage hurts synchronicity. 
Research by Gul et al. (2009), the results are substantial shareholders, and large 
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shareholders' government positively affects synchronicity while audit quality and 
foreign investment hurt synchronicity. 
According to the research of Gyamfi et al. (2015), board size (commissioner) 
has a significant positive effect on synchronicity. This result indicates that when the 
board size (commissioner) has a large scale, it will note with high synchronicity 
where the company information reflected is smaller than market information. When 
more market information is displayed, it will synchronize with the market to make 
company transparency low. Low transparency due to the large board size 
(commissioners) causes the board of commissioners to find it challenging to 
coordinate and resolve problems in the company. Also, there is the issue of 'free-rider' 
in which not all boards of commissioners supervise the company's management 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). According to Tas and Tan (2016), the board 
size (commissioner) is not significant to transparency. According to Adam and 
Mehran (2003), board size (commissioners), which have a large scale, can effectively 
carry out supervision to increase company transparency and low synchronicity. 
Corporate transparency increases because more company information reflected in the 
market compared to market information. 
The big4 audit has no significant effect on synchronicity (Gyamfi et al., 
2015). According to Gul et al. (2009), big4 audit has a significant negative impact on 
synchronicity. Companies that use big4 audit have profound synchronicity because 
the company information is more reflected than market information to make company 
transparency high. Excellent company transparency because when companies use 
big4 auditors, there will be a lot of company information displayed on financial 
reports, and the quality of audits conducted is also better than not-big4 auditors 
(Mitton, 2002; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008; Kim and Shi, 2009). Proper audit 
quality is also due to the influence of the auditor's reputation effect, where large audit 
companies have more incentives used to minimize errors in conducting audits 
(Angelo, 1981). 
According to Gyamfi et al. (2015), institutional ownership does not 
significantly affect synchronicity. After all, institutional investors enter the capital 
market to place excess funds owned but not used to execute projects with a positive 
NPV because institutional investors may not be interested in the company's activities 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). According to An and Zhang (2013), institutional 
ownership has a significant positive effect on synchronicity. This result shows that 
when institutional ownership gets bigger, it will cause high synchronicity. The 
company's shares are more synchronous with the market because the company 
information reflected in the market is smaller than the market information, which 
makes the company's transparency low. Low company transparency due to transient 
institution investors is more focused on getting maximum profit in the short term. 
Temporary institutions are more focused on short-term investments because investors 
cannot get company-specific information relevant in the long run. Investors would 
prefer to sell their shares rather than spend more to discipline managers when the 
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company has poor performance (Bushee, 1998; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). 
According to Le et al. (2006), Langnan et al. (2007), and Ramzi (2008), the presence 
of institutional ownership in the list of company shareholders will affect the level of 
transparency of the company. Institutional owners will conduct strict supervision to 
reduce the information asymmetry that occurs in the company to be more transparent 
and low synchronicity. Profound synchronicity is because company information is 
more reflected than market information, making companies have high transparency. 
The market to book ratio has a significant positive effect on synchronicity 
(Gyamfi et al., 2015; An and Zhang, 2013). This statement shows that when a 
company has high growth potential, it will cause high synchronicity because its 
information reflected in the market is less than market information, so the company's 
transparency is low. The low transparency is because companies with high growth 
potential are usually newly listed and not matured firms that have long listed. High 
competition levels will follow recently registered companies with higher growth, so 
companies do not want to disclose company-specific information. As a matured firm 
and has long been listed on the stock exchange, the company has profound 
synchronicity because it will be more transparent about the company's information. 
According to Tas and Tan (2016) and Gul et al. (2009), the market to book ratio has a 
significant negative effect on synchronicity. When a company has high growth 
potential, the company will give a signal in the market more openly about company 
information so that investors can find out the company's ability to create excellent 
company transparency and profound synchronicity (Hasan et al., 2014). Little 
synchronicity is because company information is more reflected than market 
information, making companies have high transparency. 
According to Gyamfi et al. (2015), the firm's implied volatility has a significant 
positive effect on synchronicity. The change in income varies due to competition 
between companies (Li et al., 2003). This high level of competition causes companies 
to be less willing to be open to the company's information. Tas and Tan (2016) 
implied volatility of the firm has a significant negative effect on synchronicity. When 
changes in income are substantial, it will cause uncertainty of income at the company. 
The risk of revenue requires companies to be more open to existing information to be 
transparent. Important company transparency causes low synchronicity because 
company information is reflected more than market information. According to Gul et 
al. (2009), the firm's implied volatility does not significantly influence synchronicity. 
This study will use seven variables consisting of 3 independent variables: 
proxies from GCG, namely board size (commissioner), big4audit, institutional 
ownership, and other independent variables are market to book ratio and fundamental 
volatility of the firm. The control variables used are leverage and firm size. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
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This study uses a time sample by entering all non-financial sector companies 
listed on the IDX for the 2012-2016 periods. One hundred ninety-eight companies 
meet the criteria and become the target population. 
According to Tas and Tan (2016), corporate governance is crucial for 
developing countries where investor security is still relatively low. The existence of 
corporate governance can reduce information asymmetry in the company. Companies 
with good quality governance will make the company more open about the company's 
information (Beeks and Brown, 2005). In some literature, stock return synchronicity 
is used to understand the company's openness (transparency). Stock return 
synchronicity can be explained where the stock market tends to move in the same 
direction in a period (Khandaker, 2011). The market will be more synchronous when 
the movement of individual stock prices changes with market share prices. Through 
the movement of the share price, the condition and performance of the company had 
reflected. According to Jin and Myres (2006), stock return synchronicity can describe 
the company's transparency because the movement of the company's shares can 
reflect information about the company. 
In this study, company transparency is measured using stock return 
synchronicity with the formula: 




To measure R ^ 2 (R square), a market model method is needed 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =∝𝑖+ 𝛽1 × 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝑅𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡…………………(2) 
Later a linear regression will be performed between the company's stock 
returns, market returns, and market returns t-1 to get the value R ^ 2 (R square) using 
the Eviews program. Data for calculation of company stock returns and market 
returns uses daily data. If the company's synchronicity is high, it will cause the 
company's transparency to be low (Gul et al., 2010). This low transparency is because 
market information is reflected more than company information. 
The board of commissioners (BS) is the number of members of the board of 
commissioners, both from internal and external companies. Beasley et al. (2005) 
classify the most significant international accounting firm with high audit quality 
called the big4 audit firm (BIG4). The accounting firms included in the big4 audit 
firm is Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernest and Young, Deloitte and Touche, and 
KPMG. The company has the best audit capabilities compared to accounting firms 
that did not include in the big4 audit firm. An accountant company with a good 
reputation will provide many incentives for auditors to minimize the mistakes that 
occur. This effect is referred to as auditor reputation effects (Deangelo, 1981). 
Measurements made by giving the number 1 if the company was audited by one of 
the big4 auditors and the number 0 if vice versa. Institutional Ownership (IO) is share 
ownership by a legal entity. The existence of institutional ownership in a company 
will encourage increased oversight of company management. Supervision carried out 
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by institutional investors is needed to reduce information asymmetry between 
management and stakeholders. Control conducted will impact the transparency of a 
company (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Institutional ownership is measured by the 
percentage of institutional shareholders of the total shareholders. 
Market to book ratio (MB) is a ratio used to measure a company's growth 
potential. When a company has high growth potential, the company will give signals 
in the market more openly about company information so that investors can know the 
company's ability (Hasan et al., 2014). Market to book ratio calculated by dividing 
market capitalization by total equity. Implied volatility of firm (FF) is to see changes 
in income received by the company. The uncertainty of a company's revenue stream 
is measured by the risk (standard deviation) of return on assets (ROA) calculated for 
five years. 
Leverage (LEV) is a ratio to measure the extent to which a company's assets 
can be financed by debt. It also can measure the company's ability to fulfill its 
responsibilities (Kasmir, 2008). When companies often use debt, it can be expected 
that a company will become more transparent because creditors will conduct 
supervision to ensure that the company can pay its obligations—leverage calculated 
with a debt ratio. Firm size is a grouping of companies in large, medium, and small 
groups. The scale used to measure companies included in large, medium, and small 
groups are to look at the company's total assets (Suwito and Herawaty, 2005). The 
firm's size (FS) can be measured using the natural logarithm formula for total assets. 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
The data used is panel data, and after conducting the Chow and Hausmman test, the 
model that will apply for analysis is the fixed effect model. 
Table 1 
Data Processing Results 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Hypothesis (to 
transparency) 
BS 0.035935 1.706*** Negative 
BIG4 0.22629 1.193939 Positive 
IO -0.306846 -2.5546** Positive 
MB 0.001227 1.314704 Positive 
FF 0.006831 1.911*** Positive 
LEV -0.298251 -3.68845* Positive 
FS -0.103508 -1.476173 Positive 
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From table 1, it can be seen that the effect of board size (commissioners) on 
transparency is negative and significant. A large board size causes the company's 
transparency to decrease due to the large size of the board of commissioners, which 
makes it difficult for the board of commissioners to coordinate and resolve problems 
that occur in the company. Also, there is the issue of 'free-rider' in which not all 
boards of commissioners supervise the company's management (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993). These results are supported by Gyamfi et al. (2015), which 
states a negative relationship between board size (commissioners) and transparency. 
Table 1 shows that the big4 audit and transparency variables are negative but not 
significant. The negative relationship indicates that when a company uses one of the 
big4 auditors, its transparency decreases. According to Francis & Yu (2009), it is 
likely due to the low level of competition faced by the big 4 KAP, which makes the 
audit quality produced by the big 4 KAP decline. Market dependence on the 
superiority of KAP big 4 makes KAP, not the big four challenging to compete. With 
the condition of having many clients, making KAP big four feel that they are in a safe 
area and tend to pay less attention to the audit quality so that it allows a decrease in 
audit quality. However, the results of this study are not significant; this is supported 
by research by Gyamfi et al. (2015), who found no significant negative relationship to 
transparency. That is because whether using the big four or not big-4 audit services, 
companies going public should disclose company information through financial 
reports that have been prepared by financial accounting standards and have been 
audited by public accountants registered with the Financial Services Authority (OJK). 
The discloses should be done so that investors can know about the company's state so 
that investors can consider it in making investment decisions (Kusumawati, 2013 and 
Sebayang, 2014). 
Based on table 1, the relationship between institutional ownership and 
transparency is positive and significant. So, according to Le et al. (2006), Langnan et 
al. (2007), and Ramzi (2008), the presence of institutional ownership in the list of 
company shareholders will affect the level of transparency of the company. 
Institutional owners will conduct strict supervision to reduce the information 
asymmetry that occurs in the company to be more transparent and low synchronicity. 
Profound synchronicity is because company information is more reflected than 
market information, making companies have high transparency. 
From table 1, the effect of the market to book on transparency is negative but not 
significant. The negative relationship shows that when a company has high growth 
potential, it will cause high synchronicity because its information reflected in the 
market is less than market information, so the company's transparency is low. The 
low transparency is because companies with high growth potential are usually newly 
listed companies and not matured firms that have long been listed. High levels of 
competition will follow high growth in newly listed companies, so companies do not 
want to disclose company-specific information. However, the results of this study are 
not significant. That is because both companies with high or low growth 
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opportunities have the same motivation to attract investors' attention by disclosing 
company information so that investors can get information about the company in full, 
and investors can get the same information (Indriani, 2013). 
The fundamental volatility firm variable has a significant negative effect on 
transparency. This volatility is supported by Gyamfi et al. (2015); there is a change in 
income that varies due to the level of competition between companies (Li et al., 
2003). This high level of competition causes companies to be less willing to be open 
to the company's information. Low company transparency creates high synchronicity 
because market information is reflected more than company information. Leverage 
variables have a significant positive relationship with transparency. This positive 
relationship supported by An and Zhang (2013), when the company's leverage is 
increasing, the agency conflict in the company will be reduced because managers will 
disclose information to lenders, so that company transparency increases and 
synchronicity is low. The low synchronicity is because company information is 
reflected more in the market than in market information. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
This low synchronicity means that the relationship between firm size and 
transparency is positive but not significant. This positive relationship indicates that 
companies with a larger size of stock prices can better describe the state of the market 
because large companies are a significant part of the companies included in the 
market and industry indexes and have various business segments in multiple 
industries (Chan and Hameed, 2006). Also, companies with a larger size will be more 
open in disclosing existing information, so that company transparency is high (Firth, 
1979). it is indicated that more company information is displayed in the market than 
market information to create low synchronicity and high company transparency. 
However, this study's results are not significant; this is supported by research by Tas 
and Tan (2016), who found an insignificant positive relationship between firm size 
and transparency. That is because both large and small companies, when going public 
they will be in the public spotlight and under the supervision of government agencies 
or stock exchanges so that they will carry out excellent or minimum corporate 
governance following the rules of the Financial Services Authority (OJK). The 
implementation of good corporate governance will minimize information asymmetry 
within the company to be more transparent (Sundari et al., 2015). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The board size variable (commissioner) in this study has a negative and 
significant relationship to transparency. The large size of the commissioners' board 
makes it difficult for the board of commissioners to coordinate and resolve problems 
that occur in the company. Also, there is the issue of 'free-rider' where not all boards 
of commissioners supervise the company's management. The institutional ownership 
variable in this study has a positive and significant relationship to transparency. The 
presence of institutional ownership on the company's shareholder list will affect the 
company's transparency. The fundamental volatility firm variable in this study has a 
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significant negative relationship with transparency. The change in income varies due 
to the level of competition between companies. This high level of competition causes 
companies to be less willing to be open to the company's information. The leverage 
variable in this study has a significant positive relationship with transparency. When 
the company's leverage is increasing, the company's agency conflict will be reduced 
because the managers will disclose the information available to the lender so that the 
company's transparency increases and makes synchronicity low. Simultaneously, the 
big4 audit variable, market to book, and firm size do not affect transparency. 
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